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Cybersecurity problems in a typical hospital 
(and probably in all of them) 
Harold Thimbleby 
 
Swansea University 
Wales 
Abstract   A criminal case balancing on the corruption of patient data in a UK 
hospital resulted in some nurses being acquitted and some given community service 
and custodial sentences. This paper explains the background, demonstrates the in-
ability of hospital IT systems to provide reliable evidence, and highlights broader 
problems with IT culture affecting manufacturers, hospitals, police, legal advisors 
— and ultimately misleading clinicians and compromising delivery of care.  
The NHS (and healthcare more generally) urgently needs to improve its IT 
awareness, management and policies. The police and the legal system need a more 
mature approach to IT. Manufacturers need to provide dependable systems that are 
fit for purpose for complex hospital environments. Regulators should ensure that 
systems meet better standards of quality and dependability.  
This paper includes recommendations; the most fundamental being that 
hospitals acknowledge that IT is unreliable and they should procure and manage 
equipment with this in mind. In particular, mature and effective data protection and 
cybersecurity policies must be in place and used proactively. When problems occur, 
evidence derived from IT (whether systems or devices) must not be used in legal or 
disciplinary investigations without extreme care and independent proof of prove-
nance. 
Cite as: H. Thimbleby, “Cybersecurity problems in a typical hospital (and probably 
all of them),” in Developing Safe Systems, Proceedings of the 25th Safety-Critical 
Systems Symposium (M. Parsons & T. Kelly, eds), pp415–439, Centre for Software 
Reliability, Safety-Critical Systems Club, 2017. ISBN 978-1540796288 
1 Introduction 
This paper summarizes my insights from being an expert witness in a criminal case 
involving alleged fabrication of patient data by nurses.  
The outcome and details of the court case are in the public domain, but the aim 
of this paper is not to tell a story about a hospital or its nurses, but rather to tell a 
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more worrying story: this could happen anywhere — and probably is happening 
everywhere.  
The court case collapsed because prosecution evidence was derived from flawed 
data, flawed IT and flawed management of IT. Nurses were blamed, but the under-
lying causes must be understood as basic cybersecurity issues that should have been 
taken seriously as such when they happened. The allegedly incriminating data and 
the later corruption of data (the final understanding of which led to the trial collaps-
ing) should have been detected as and when they happened.  
One wonders how many other cases inappropriately pursue clinicians caught up 
in fallout from IT chaos, with nobody recognizing or wanting to admit or check that 
IT can cause such problems. It is worrying that the case here very nearly did not end 
at all happily, and would not have ended as well as it did without a lot of work 
correcting widespread misunderstandings of IT — and, harder!, correcting wide-
spread unconscious and unintentional misunderstandings of IT.  
Although we are not criticizing hospitals or their staff, in view of understandable 
sensitivities this paper does not provide any citations to the court case or to related 
evidence. We have avoided using identifiable names in this paper, though we have 
not changed technical details or standard procedures. However, numbers have been 
rounded and ward names changed, etc. Although the blood glucometers and data-
bases are made by a company we will call TechCo, we do not think this company 
is egregious: we think their products are of typical quality and design for the indus-
try. The story is therefore representative of the industry and its regulation, not about 
any one company; similarly, the story is not about one hospital nor about any nurses 
in it; it is about all hospitals and their staff, and what can unwittingly happen. 
At a higher level the story is about the widespread misunderstanding of IT in 
healthcare, and in particular, about mismanagement of IT by hospitals and by the 
police. Note that TechCo’s systems are used across the NHS and worldwide. 
The one sentence take home is that there must be effective, mature procedures 
and understanding in place to detect and manage cybersecurity problems before 
they trigger catastrophes. The story here fortunately involved no patient harm or 
malicious hacking, but that was only by luck. Healthcare cyberattacks are “growing 
exponentially” (Davidson, 2016) — with 113 million US electronic health records 
breached in 2015. Pure luck protecting staff and patients cannot hold out for long. 
2 A public perspective 
Concerns about the quality of patient care in a hospital ward led to a police investi-
gation. For the criminal investigation, the police focused on the treatment of vul-
nerable adults, which may be criminal even though there is no patient harm. Indeed 
in this case there was no patient harm caused by poor care. 
There was considerable political and public interest in this case, particularly 
since the powerful and high-profile criticism of Robert Francis’s 2013 Report of	
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the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (“The Francis Re-
port”); nobody wanted another Mid Staffs.  
The news reported stories of many — over 50 — nurses being investigated and 
soon of an imminent court trial. (I did not follow the internal investigations.) The 
nurses were alleged to have fabricated blood glucose readings (that is, not having 
actually taken any readings from patients) and then written them up in paper patient 
notes. For vulnerable adult patients this would be criminal. The implication was that 
the nurses were lazy and dishonest and had put patients at risk. Publically, it was 
known that three nurses pleaded guilty, but two pleaded not guilty and their case 
proceeded to a jury trial. 
TechCo’s blood glucometers are used in the hospital, and they automatically up-
load glucose readings to a central patient record system. The police established that 
the central record system had no records of many tests the nurses had written on 
patient paper notes. Therefore the police concluded that the nurses had written down 
fictitious readings and not bothered to do their job properly.  
The police were thorough in their investigations and considered various ways the 
nurses may have made accidental errors. The police compared paper records with a 
computer database, involving around 150,000 test records — a great deal of com-
bined manual and computer work! 
In addition to identifying alleged fabrication (that is, paper records with no cor-
responding computer records) the police also found evidence of many cases of poor 
operating practice. For example, a nurse is supposed to enter the patient’s ID, but 
sometimes a nurse will scan their own staff card instead. This is easier and enables 
the glucometer to work, so the nurse can quickly obtain a test reading. From the 
computer records it is clear there are many cases of this practice. (The next section, 
below, describes in more detail what nurses are supposed to do.) 
The accused nurses had followed such bad practice repeatedly, and under the UK 
Criminal Justice Act this was considered evidence of “bad character.” Put briefly 
this means that if proven guilty your sentence may be harsher: not only are you 
guilty of the crime, but you are a bad person. The bad character concept makes sense 
when a crook is arrested for one, perhaps relatively petty, crime but nevertheless is 
known to be a hardened criminal. 
The prosecution argued that there were no problems with the equipment. There 
are national databases in the UK and USA for reporting problems, and no related 
problems had ever been reported with TechCo’s systems. Therefore this was a nurs-
ing problem, not a system problem, they argued. 
The case thus went to trial … but weeks later the trial collapsed. The two nurses 
were released. 
TV crews were there and filmed a patient victim group protesting outside the 
court. The media presented the collapse of the trial as a failure; as if the nurses were 
still guilty because the trial only collapsed on legal technicalities. 
The other nurses who had previously pleaded guilty did not change their plea 
and were later sentenced, some to community service and some to prison. 
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3 What do nurses do on the ward? 
To help patients manage blood glucose levels (particularly if the patients have lim-
ited capacity to look after themselves) it is important to take and record blood glu-
cose test readings. Using the TechCo blood glucometer, an outline of the operating 
procedure is follows: 
1. Find a glucometer; 
2. The nurse then identifies themselves to the device (by scanning the barcode on 
their staff card or by typing their ID); 
3. The patient ID is scanned from their barcode or typed; 
4. Scan a glucose test strip, clean the patient’s finger; the patient is pricked and a 
drop of blood placed on the test strip; 
5. The test strip is inserted in the glucometer; 
6. The glucometer displays the blood glucose level (or possibly an error); 
7. The nurse may then take immediate action to address any clinical issues; 
8. The nurse then “contemporaneously” writes down on the paper patient notes the 
time and reading;  
9. One further step, that has no immediate clinical significance, is that the glucome-
ter must be placed in a dock, and then its data will be automatically uploaded to 
TechCo’s central systems.  
The TechCo glucometer itself can record over 2,000 readings before it needs to be 
docked, and it will warn if its memory is full. This memory feature means that 
TechCo’s glucometer can be used for batching tests: a nurse can test a whole ward, 
respond to patients’ needs, then later write up the results using the glucometer re-
view screen to recollect individual test details. 
Once successfully uploaded to TechCo’s systems, the test readings will later ap-
pear in the main patient records available on ward PCs — however, this might take 
days or longer (see below).  
3.1 Patient ID workarounds 
Barcode workarounds are a well-known problem (Koppel, et al, 2008), and indeed 
sometimes it is hard to scan or read the patient ID, so one workaround is to type 000 
etc on the glucometer keyboard, or more easily just scan the staff ID barcode again 
just to get a number the glucometer accepts as a valid “patient ID.” Using the staff 
ID instead of the patient ID is called “double tapping” and (perhaps) coincidentally 
the number of nurses in the database who double tapped at least twice in the period 
for which I have data is approximately equal to the number of nurses originally 
investigated. 
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The glucometer accepts both of these workarounds (arbitrary IDs and double 
tapping) and will still give a correct blood glucose reading. Behind the scenes, how-
ever, the hospital had configured its systems to reject this data, which then requires 
manual intervention (which may never happen, or may introduce further errors) to 
fix it. It should be noted that configuring the system in this way makes sense: the 
blood glucose reading in the database cannot be reliably associated with any partic-
ular patient in the database until the issue is manually resolved. 
I would argue that double tapping and other workarounds, since they are trivial 
to detect, should be sorted out immediately rather than ignored — TechCo’s sys-
tems can be configured to detect these problems immediately they occur. Since dou-
ble tapping was so prevalent, I believe nurses were not aware it was problematic 
nor that it was being monitored. Since double-tapped data at this hospital got lost, 
this fact would further confirm to nurses the irrelevance of docking the glucometer. 
4 An expert witness perspective 
I was invited by the defence team to be an expert witness. In fact, an expert witness 
in the UK works for the court, but in this case the defence thought the truth would 
help their case.  
My first comment was that if so many nurses are all alleged to have made the 
same mistakes, it is more likely there may be a common explanation, such as an IT 
failure — which would affect everybody. The legal view, however, was that if many 
nurses are making the same mistakes “they are all in it together” and the bad char-
acter concept applies.  
My first task was to analyze the prosecution evidence (presented as a CD of Ex-
cel spreadsheets and, later, data logged on blood glucometers and XML files) to see 
if the police had made any mistakes claiming that the test data was not there. 
It was easy to show that the data the police claimed was not there was indeed not 
there. Nor was closely related data, as might be expected if glucometer clocks were 
not synchronized with nurse watches, or if other minor transcription errors had been 
made, and so on.  
If data was not present, it implied, so the prosecution claimed, that the nurses 
had fabricated doing actual tests — for if they had actually done the tests, the data 
would be present in the spreadsheets they argued. That is possible, but I thought it 
far more likely that IT problems or even a “technician with a grudge” would be a 
simpler explanation — indeed, normal operation of TechCo’s system requires ad-
ministrators to make changes to data, for instance to sort out double tapping.  
That over 20% of the database had an error flag set my raised suspicions; this 
was becoming a much more complex story than the prosecution painted. Another 
worry was that a comment field on each test said “Wrong patient” for just 2 entries 
and nothing at all for the remaining hundreds of thousands of entries — suggesting 
to me that nobody was really paying much attention to the management of the da-
tabase; indeed, the “reviewed” flag was false for almost all data entries.  
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I noted that staff names occurred with many implausibly close variant spellings 
(e.g., differing only in capitalization or spacing, or variants like Jon and John but 
with the same surname and ID). Many identical staff names occurred with different 
numeric IDs. All this, and more, suggested the database was not well-managed and 
might not be reliable for the purposes the prosecution wanted it for. Moreover, the 
poor staff data suggests that the TechCo features for only permitting authorized staff 
to use the glucometer might easily have been compromised (how can it reliably lock 
out unauthorized staff when the staff data is so poor?).  
Unfortunately for the police, proving absent data is absent for a specific reason 
is hard when the provenance and quality of the data is in question. Moreover, Excel 
spreadsheets have no way to audit: it is impossible to tell whether rows or columns 
have been deleted, been edited, or even had never existed. 
 
Figure 1. Recorded movement of glucometer dockings around the hospital over a period of 
one year. Note the centrality of the laboratory as a hub of movement, and that Ward 22 
seems to have a lot of activity — 25 movements. Since wards presumably try to maintain a 
constant stock of glucometers, there must be other movement that is not being recorded. 
(The diagram layout is arbitrary and unrelated to the real numbering and locations of wards, 
and to further help preserve anonymity, some of the “wards” aren’t strictly wards at all.) 
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The police claimed they had used forensic methods to make the copies of the 
database. In fact, some being CSV (an Excel data format) files proved there had 
been manual intervention: the hospital database was SQL so a manual process had 
converted it. Some of the Excel worksheets had differences further strongly sug-
gesting an unreliable process had been used to create or edit them. 
The police had copied Excel spreadsheets at the hospital to a USB stick and only 
then digitally signed the data and held it securely. Unfortunately, this “forensic ri-
gor” came too late: the police should have made a signed copy of the original data-
base, not a manually created copy on a USB stick. Anything could have happened 
to contaminate the Excel data earlier than the signing. Had rows or columns been 
deleted or edited, Excel provides no way to tell.  
The police seized several blood glucometers from the ward in question and pre-
sented the data on them as evidence. The police failed to seize at least two other 
glucometers that had been docked on the ward over the period of the alleged fabri-
cations but which were (presumably) in other wards or being serviced when the 
police seized the ones they did. (Note that the database only shows where glucome-
ters are docked, not where blood glucose tests are made — to know that, the test 
data needs to be related to patient/ward data.) 
The police sent the seized glucometers to TechCo to confirm they worked cor-
rectly and to get their data. Unsurprisingly, TechCo said they worked correctly. 
 
Figure 2. Diagram presented in court (anonymized) originally sized as A4; the smaller repro-
duction here serves to indicate the complexity of the network, but note that Box 8 contains un-
known further software. The basic problem was that there were discrepancies between the 
paper records (bottom left) and the final computer records (bottom right). Note that not all 
relevant systems are TechCo’s (the “middleware” box may, and probably does, contain further 
complications). Numbers in the figure were used to cross reference this diagram to other 
expert evidence. 
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In fact, as figure 1 shows, glucometers move around the hospital. If a glucometer 
has a fault (e.g., a dead battery) would be returned for servicing and replaced by 
another. If a nurse needs a glucometer but cannot find one, they may borrow one 
from another ward. Glucometers may also get lost, perhaps at the back of a cupboard 
or sent off for repair. In the Excel data, glucometers were used almost hourly during 
the day on the ward in this story, but some glucometers in the hospital were not used 
at all for over 100 days and many not used at all for over a week — where were 
they? Where were all the glucometers that had ever been used on the ward when 
the police came? I do not think the hospital kept an inventory that tracked where 
glucometers were: if it had, it would have formed an essential part of their evidence. 
It is possible that the alleged non-measurements are still sitting on a glucometer 
somewhere, but which is still waiting to be docked. Indeed, one XML file I got 
during the trial showed a 4 year gap between a measurement being taken and the 
data transferred to the database. The alleged incidents happened less than 4 years 
before the trial, so perhaps the missing data is still on its way — the alleged incidents 
did not happen that long before the trial! 
There was much internal evidence that the databases were of very low quality, 
and of course there was the problem that there was no forensic route from the orig-
inal SQL database to the Excel worksheet; worse, by TechCo’s design, there was 
 
Figure 3. Diagram presented in court (anonymized) to show key sources of evidence, though 
originally sized as A4 — for the present paper the details are less important than noting the 
complexity, with no end-to-end checking. The police made digitally signed copies of Evidence 1, 
2 and 3, but signing occurred after the police had manually copied the data, so it could only be 
used to show the data had not changed after it had been collected. The digital signatures did not 
assure that the data was what it was claimed to be. This diagram does not show TechCo’s 
modifications of data, which only became apparent after the diagram submitted to the court. 
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no reliable connection between the glucometers and the main database itself. There 
were many failure points, for example (see also figures 2 and 3): 
• A glucometer may lose data itself; 
• A glucometer may not be docked; 
• A glucometer may be physically lost or returned for repair; 
• Docking may fail, whether because of manual interference on the ward or by 
technical issues such as internet connectivity problems, unrecognized new serv-
ers and so on; 
• TechCo’s glucometers only store about 2,000 readings, yet the database shows 
they were used for nearly 5,000 tests: the data on the glucometers is not evidence 
whether nurses used the glucometers earlier than the glucometer records cover; 
• … this list is not exhaustive. 
Once docked, the data has a tortuous route through middleware and TechCo’s 
own software. It can take days to get through. In particular, manual intervention is 
required for some data, but there was no evidence provided that any manual inter-
ventions had occurred. For example, if a glucose reading is rejected by the software, 
it is put into a holding folder and must be sorted out manually. Many patient IDs on 
the database were short-hands like 000, probably occurring because for the nurse it 
is far more important to get a measurement than worry about the technicalities of 
what happens after the glucometer is docked. Nobody had sorted out this poor data. 
Such problems have not been reported on national databases to my knowledge 
(such as the US FDA’s Maude), but there are peer-reviewed research papers that 
report identical problems at other hospitals with the same TechCo devices [so I shall 
not cite them]. At one hospital discussed in one paper, starting to check the database 
reduced poor practice such as using staff IDs for patient IDs. So what the prosecu-
tion should have concluded is not “this problem does not occur anywhere else” (i.e., 
 
Figure 4. Side-by-side comparison of accepted glucose tests per day (left), with rejected tests per 
day (right) over the same period. Successful tests per day closely track patient numbers, but 
rejects show no obvious pattern — one would assume rejects per day to correlate with the 
number of successful tests per day. In particular, note long periods of exactly zero rejected tests 
contrasting with brief periods of very high reject rates, almost double the number of accepted 
tests. A simple explanation is that some records of rejected tests were manually deleted, some 
may have been merged, and possibly some dates were arbitrarily corrupted. 
Confidential. Monday, 12 October 2015 at 09:45
Another way of picturing the same data is to plot the full d tasets side by side:
Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr
0
100
200
300
400
Tests per day in CH/15 (from 1 Jan 2012)
Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Rejects per day (from 1 Jan 2012)
The data is unrelated.
As we now show, although we can think of good reasons for the variation
in the lefthand graph, we ca not think of any systematic reason for the rejection
variation visuali ed clearly in the righthand graph.
Consider the slight August dip in the lefthand graph. Perhaps there may be
fewer tests in August because there are fewer patients in the ward? This seems
plausible, and indeed if we normalise the test data by number unique of patients,
the lefthand graph becomes remarkably smooth.
Page 14 of 24
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the nurses must be being unprofessional) but rather “this problem routinely occurs 
elsewhere, but nobody worries about it enough to report it” (i.e., the nurses are be-
having normally). 
4.1 The collapse of the case 
During the trial, the prosecution produced new evidence: an encrypted CD of giga-
bytes of XML files. This was the first evidence I had seen that had timestamps cov-
ering the period of the alleged incidents. (Though, as before, there was no digital 
signature or proof of provenance.) 
The court adjourned while we analyzed this data. With effort the defence and 
prosecution then agreed a joint statement on the significance of this data, though 
some parts of the report, covering different features of the data, were written sepa-
rately. The prosecution’s case continued: the critical missing data was still not pre-
sent.  
I noted that the data had a very peculiar distribution, strongly suggesting data 
mismanagement, bugs or equivalent. See figure 4 for a simple example from my 
analysis.  
TechCo was therefore called to be cross-examined over the joint report. During 
this cross-examination it became clear that this witness had visited the hospital be-
fore the police had seized a copy of the data. It emerged that TechCo had “tidied 
up” the database, and they had kept no records of what they had done. 
The judge then made a ruling: the prosecution evidence was unreliable and had 
to be excluded. Asked what they wanted to do, the prosecution said they had no 
evidence and sat down. The judge ordered the jury foreman to clear the defendants 
as there was no case to answer. “Set the prisoners free!” he said. 
My many other arguments for the unreliability of the evidence therefore never 
needed to be raised or cross-examined before the jury. For example, the trial did not 
get to exploring the consequences of the police seizing the wrong glucometers, of 
the hospital not having (or appearing not to have) any inventory for tracking glu-
cometers. The court never explored the very poor data quality or reasons behind it.  
The prosecution had implicitly gambled that any problem with their evidence 
could undermine the credibility of all of it. They ultimately needed to prove that 
absent data was caused specifically by deliberate nurse behavior, and they needed 
to prove that absence proved nurse fabrication rather than other possibilities. I 
would have liked to have shown, for instance, that the poor design of TechCo’s 
equipment could provide no evidentially acceptable relation between absence and 
nurse behavior, but the confession that TechCo had manipulated data (and forgotten 
exactly what they had done) was enough to undermine all the prosecution evidence.  
If the glucometers had been designed appropriately, they would have kept better 
records of successful (and failed) end-to-end blood test transmission. If they had, 
either the police would have had a very easy job (if the nurses had actually fabri-
cated data) or the hospital would have easily known about their poor IT systems 
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before the police turned up. Certainly if the TechCo database had included con-
firmed transfer and missing data information, the police would have known imme-
diately the evidence was unreliable — though it will be recalled that they did not 
notice error flags and other indicators of poor quality in the data they actually had. 
4.2 Technical discussion 
The blood glucometers and related systems were not designed to be dependable. Or 
at least they were not designed to be dependable for any purpose other than taking 
measurements and immediately displaying results. The written evidence from 
TechCo strongly suggested that the software in them was not of high quality: for 
example, they wrote “[…] we should hopefully be able to confirm that this meter 
also had no corrupt records.” But “hopefully” is not good enough!  
It is interesting that there are research papers showing the TechCo glucometers 
are accurate blood glucometers. The prosecution understandably mentioned this, 
arguing that they were therefore good devices. As a matter of fact, accuracy was not 
relevant to the case. Regardless of whether the glucometers were accurate, the issue 
was fabricated readings not whether they were accurate readings. The relevant 
quality criterion for the case was whether the glucometers reliably transmitted test 
data to the hospital’s patient record system. I could find no research exploring this 
aspect of their reliability. From the vague written evidence from TechCo, I sus-
pected they were not very reliable at all in this regard, or at least they had been 
designed (by TechCo) so that TechCo could not answer this question definitively. 
TechCo’s database software has a warning “this product is not for diagnostic 
use” (reproduced in figure 5) — and if it is not good enough for diagnostic use, why 
was it used for evidence? Why did the hospital even have software that was not for 
diagnostic use managing glucometer databases? Rejected test data (e.g., with bad 
patient IDs) has to be edited with this product; if that isn’t clinical use, what is it? 
To be charitable, the database might have been intended for maintenance of the 
glucometers. For example, while I was double-checking I was correctly interpreting 
it, I plotted performance of the glucometers against battery voltage and temperature, 
data the glucometers record. There were interesting digitization effects, though I 
could not tell whether this was how the glucometers worked or whether it was an 
artifact of processing the data through TechCo’s software, SQL or Excel.  
Surely, if the data had not been used for clinical purposes, then the police should 
have been very cautious extrapolating to imply criminal clinical practice: they 
should have used independent evidence to establish the records were reliable. Given 
 
Figure 5. Copy taken directly from TechCo’s database system manual. It is worth noting 
that the nurses were doing what the manual says: they were using the point of care instru-
ment (the glucometer) and writing down the results. 
PrecisionWeb User’s Manual  Introduction 
  1-1 
1. About the PrecisionWeb Point of Care Data  
Management System 
 
Thank you for selecting the PrecisionWeb Point of Care Data Management System. 
 
Intended Use 
 
The PrecisionWeb Data Management System is a browser-based software application that allows 
you to manage your Point of Care (POC) program from any computer throughout your healthcare 
facility.  Note that the PrecisionWeb Data Management system was previously called QC Manager 3.0 
and is referred to as QCM3 throughout this manual. 
 
The PrecisionWeb data management system includes configurable features to automatically or 
manually forward patient and Quality Control (QC) results to the Laboratory or Hospital Information 
System (LIS or HIS).  
In addition, a bi-directional interface allows data to be uploaded from and downloaded to any 
supported instrument.  The bi-directional interface helps you to manage data and comply with 
laboratory standards and policies.   
 
This product is not for diagnostic use; all patient diagnostics should be based on results reported by 
the point of care instrument.   
 
User Interface Screens 
 
 The User Interface (UI) scre ns are designed to support the management of test results, 
operators, instruments and lots (reagent lots, control lots, linearity lots and proficiency lots).   
 
 The UI scree s allow you to set up the facilities within your organization and name the 
associated departments and locations.  
 
Multiple Users 
 
 Multiple users can access the system at one time.  
 
 The system allows for customized levels of access.  Each level of access will provide the user with 
visibility to the UI screens and functions specific to the user's needs.  This is referred to as custom 
scope and permissions. 
 
 Authorized users can access the system from any networked computer using Windows Internet 
Explorer (version 5.5 or later).
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that the glucometers did not store all relevant data, the only independent evidence 
was the written patient records. The police assumed they were fabricated. 
The police assumed the glucometers and hospital IT systems were completely 
reliable, even though they knew they must require human intervention. The man-
agement of the data was not questioned by the police, and there was no evidence 
submitted about day-to-day management of the data. Possibly nobody was manag-
ing it. On the contrary, some evidence says the TechCo database system crashed 
frequently —a problem the court never examined because the case collapsed before 
we needed to draw this issue to the court’s attention. 
To take any other view than “perfect IT” would imply considering the problems 
of managing the data and of questioning the reliability of TechCo systems. If the 
police suspected a problem, they would not have sent the glucometers to TechCo. I 
think the hospital, like the police, just assumed the data was perfectly reliable for a 
criminal investigation. 
In a subsequent internal disciplinary hearing, the discredited police evidence was 
reused as if it was unproblematic. The disciplinary hearings presented a logical fal-
lacy to support using it: 
“in an internal disciplinary proceedings the burden of proof is a lower threshold than in 
criminal proceedings …  
 
The investigation looked on [the database] to verify if this blood glucose had been taken 
for this patient. This is not verified on [the database] … [the hearing concludes that] 
patient did not have 9 blood sugar recordings checked [by this nurse] … [etc]” 
Indeed, words like “this is not verified on [the database]” is a recurring phrase in 
the disciplinary hearing transcripts. To be clear: there is no reliable database evi-
dence to verify any fabricated tests or any other poor procedures. We know there is 
a lot of corrupted data, and there is a simple reason it is corrupted.  
I submitted written evidence to this disciplinary hearing, including a full expla-
nation. I quoted from the judge’s ruling: 
“Professor Thimbleby has shown that the chain has various breaks where the data can be 
lost. None of the data now relied on is original; it was all made after human intervention 
by [a TechCo employee] and he has no real recollection of what he was asked to do, what 
ID codes he was asked to consider, and did not note it at the time. All the material is at 
best edited. [The evidence] has lost significant amounts of data: but there is no way to tell 
whether the missing files were reintegrated into the [TechCo] database, in which case the 
Prosecution case might have force, or simply deleted, in which case it would not. I should 
exclude the evidence as being more prejudicial […] and unreliable hearsay. [It] would 
serve only to suggest to the jury a conclusion they could not draw – namely, that absence 
in the searches meant those results had never been in [the database] or the reject folder.”  
Since my arguments were ignored, I wonder what other influences persuaded the 
hospital it was appropriate to use invalid computer evidence even a judge (on the 
basis of professional analysis and weeks’ of detailed, critical discussions and cross 
examination) had rejected as unreliable and misleading? It is worth adding that the 
experts from the prosecution also fully agreed on the ruling. 
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In hindsight, somebody in the hospital ought to have ensured at the time and 
subsequently checked whether the police acted appropriately on original, uncon-
taminated evidence. And after the court case collapsed, somebody at the hospital 
should have checked why the case collapsed and made an informed decision 
whether disciplinary procedures should proceed on corrupt evidence.  
At any stage, it would have been easy to compare a copy of the police evidence 
taken against a rolled-back hospital database. In fact, it seems bizarre the police did 
not take a signed and dated copy of the actual time-stamped database and check it, 
rather than just take what happened to be there after it had been corrupted and not 
check it. Unfortunately, a TechCo “expert” performed the transfer of data from the 
hospital to the police, probably reinforcing the naïve impression of infallibility. 
5 Some recommendations 
5.1 What should hospitals do? 
5.1.1 A hospital collected data it did not monitor, so deleting or otherwise tamper-
ing with clinical data was not detected when it happened. Basic cybersecurity 
should have signaled TechCo’s tampering (or any other unexpected changes) 
as and when it happened. 
5.1.2 A hospital procured equipment that unreliably recorded clinical procedures. 
The hospital should monitor operational data, and take steps to correct or 
manage problems when they occur. In this case, the hospital ignored the data 
it was collecting until the police seized it, and then it was too late. 
5.1.3 A hospital should procure more dependable equipment and systems. 
5.1.4 Hospitals should disable all IT features it is not using or not monitoring.  
5.1.5 A hospital should not have clinical systems that are not designed for clinical 
use, nor should police use such systems except with proper caution. See fig-
ure 5. 
5.1.6 Hospitals should engage regular external oversight to help avoid blindspots. 
IT is very complex, and it may be impossible to recognize one’s own mis-
understandings of it without external input. Note that the manufacturers are 
not the right people for any such oversight. 
5.1.7 When police request data from a hospital, proper governance procedures 
should be adhered to. One of the problems with the case here is that the po-
lice obtained evidence without a court order, and the court had no idea what 
evidence the police had — hence the surprise of new evidence presented in 
court without any warning for the defence to interpret it. This wasted much 
court time. 
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5.1.8 Hospitals, police and courts should realize that the research literature does 
not tell the whole story of whether equipment is appropriate for clinical use. 
Clinical research papers focus on a very narrow aspect of dependability (e.g., 
whether measurements are clinically accurate), but real use is much more 
complicated (e.g., whether measurements get processed reliably in multi-
vendor systems). 
5.1.9  “Data fishing” is a serious problem. After the court case collapsed the hos-
pital resumed disciplinary proceedings that had been suspended because of 
the criminal investigations. Using the police evidence the hospital argued 
that nurses had failed to take appropriate care of patients, a conclusion drawn 
from the discredited computer evidence. But one can fish data (especially 
bad data!) to support almost any case. One type of lack of care the nurse was 
accused of also happened over 1,000 times and affected all nurses on the 
same ward over the period I have data for, though note that I do not have the 
patient data to match against sliding scales of insulin. (The corruption of data 
may have created the “evidence” for this alleged incident and may also have 
inflated the 1,000 similar cases I can find.) Given the high frequency of such 
incidents, what this one nurse was accused is routine practice. I suspect the 
disciplinary hearing had no idea of such widespread practice, or that they 
were using discredited data. It is worth saying that if this lack of care was 
serious, then TechCo’s system should have been configured to detect it as 
and when it happened; but TechCo’s system was not used for any auditing 
(so far as I know). I infer the hospital did not worry what nurses did until it 
became a public issue. 
5.1.10 Hospitals should routinely and regularly disclose to staff what data they are 
collecting and they should allow staff to see and, if necessary, to challenge 
it and the processes used to collect it. This means releasing data perhaps 
weekly if not daily. If data has no clinical role, then it should never be al-
lowed to be used as if it had or might have done (which is what happened in 
this case).  
5.1.11 Evidence discredited in the rigor of a criminal trial (and, in this case, very 
well summarized by the judge, see section 4.2) should be used to help seek 
the causes of the system failures, and should only be used with informed 
caution for disciplinary purposes.  
5.1.12 Cybersecurity, improvement and culture change is at least a full time job. 
Avoiding predictable future problems and catastrophes will require dedi-
cated staff and investment. Mature cybersecurity cannot be done alone, but 
requires collaboration across the healthcare sector and beyond — it should 
be a national priority, and local leaders need to be networking in this wider 
community just to stay up to date. This paper only discussed “simple” point 
of care equipment, but cybersecurity necessarily covers everything from 
wall-mounted emergency equipment, implants, medical apps, linear acceler-
ators to PCs, all susceptible to hacking, ransomware, trojans and viruses — 
as well as all staff education (personal apps, phishing risks, etc).  
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5.1.13 Hospitals should also consider recommendations in all other sections in this 
paper (and elsewhere); hospitals should not work alone and be unaware of 
the activities and concerns of the wider community working to help improve 
IT and cybersecurity. 
5.1.14 Best practice is, of course, that cybersecurity policies and implementations 
must be externally reviewed. 
5.2 What should manufacturers do? 
5.2.1 The very public discovery of VW’s fraudulent IT to help their cars pass 
emission tests (Hotten, 2015) — which became public during the trial 
— should serve as a powerful reminder that IT is not just unreliable, but that 
it may be unreliable intentionally. VW’s illegal emission levels are estimated 
to have contributed to tens of excess premature deaths. Manufacturers should 
adopt open source methods so that their code can be externally vetted. 
5.2.2 TechCo testified that their equipment was CE marked, and therefore any 
problems must be the nurses’ fault. With regulatory cover stories like that, 
there is little incentive for manufacturers to try harder. Manufacturers of clin-
ical products should closely consider the quality of their programming, and 
have much better arguments for courts than that they have CE marks. 
5.2.3 Hospital IT systems are very complex (through no particular fault of 
TechCo) and this complexity is not going to change any time soon. In view 
of the complexity, manufacturers must develop more defensive software — 
for instance with end-to-end checking, more logging and diagnostics, and 
with formal proofs of correctness (see section 5.5). Auditing needs to be pro-
vided, work and be used. 
5.2.4 Installed software in hospitals that is not being actively managed (as hap-
pened here with TechCo’s database) should be automatically reported, at 
least to the manufacturer who can then take remedial steps (such as recon-
figuring it or notifying the hospital to audit it). 
5.2.5 It was disappointing that no technical experts from TechCo wanted to appear 
in court, although they had provided much written evidence (though only for 
the prosecution it must be said). TechCo is based in a country outside of the 
UK’s jurisdiction. Manufacturers should be eager to support investigations 
concerning their products. 
5.2.6 Elsewhere I have written about the user interface of TechCo’s systems 
[which I will not cite here to preserve anonymity]; the poor design of the 
user interface suggests that reliable operation was not a priority or perhaps 
not a competency for the manufacturer. The evidence presented in court fur-
ther suggested the programming of the device and the database management 
software was substandard too —TechCo’s written evidence says things like 
“it is not possible to say categorically that there were no corrupt records”; 
and, symptomatically, the TechCo database systems regularly crashed. 
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Given the serious consequences of poor quality systems (patient harm, sub-
standard care, pressure on staff — even prison) manufacturers should feel an 
obligation to put high quality professional effort into their products.  
5.2.7 TechCo’s systems have an “audit” feature. I beg to disagree; it certainly has 
a feature called audit, but it is manual and fallible, and generates documents 
that are not authenticated. Features should be named and implemented to 
support the conclusions most people (and courts) would reasonably draw 
from their names. 
5.2.8 It may seem unfair to criticize manufacturers without offering any solutions. 
One easy thing to do, then, would be for all blood glucose tests (in fact, tests 
data from any equipment) to be assigned a serial number. Along with the 
glucometer ID, it would then be trivial to detect lost data (additionally, using 
digital signatures to circumvent cybersecurity problems). Lost data should 
be reported to the manufacturers post-market surveillance team. It would 
then be easy for a hospital to use best efforts to respond and recover it.  
5.3 What should regulators do? 
The CE marking system is discredited (Cohen, 2012; Cohen & Billingsley 2011), 
and fixing it to be more effective for complex computer-based systems (devices, 
medical apps, etc) is essential, particularly as computer-based technology is ubiq-
uitous and taking over healthcare. Healthcare IT systems (PC, tablet, embedded, 
point of care, etc) support patient care and it is therefore negligent if they are not 
developed using equivalent processes to the rigorous processes used in pharmaceu-
tical development (Thimbleby et al, 2015).  
There are rigorous process in pharma because we recognize that there may be 
side-effects and unknown variation in patients — analogous problems to IT and 
cybersecurity. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as used in pharma may not be 
essential for cybersecurity, but there are other methodologies such as formal meth-
ods where correctness is proved (see section 5.5). Such methods should be used, 
and should be shown to be used in any certified product. Formal methods are routine 
in aviation (where lives depend on them); they ought to be routine in healthcare too. 
Manufacturers will complain that they do not know how to use formal methods 
for their complex products. Well, they should start making products that are simple 
enough for them to understand. Logically, if the manufacturers can only “hope” to 
understand their own devices (e.g., see quote above; and failing to use formal meth-
ods means relying on hope alone), then hospitals and nurses are very unlikely to 
understand them either. 
The US FDA device regulation is only concerned with the patient; staff well-
being and effectiveness clearly ought to be a consideration too. In Europe and the 
UK (whether or not their regulation is normalized) is much more closed, obscure 
and informal (e.g., the role of notified bodies); in our complex world of IT threats, 
regulation urgently needs opening up and becoming more responsive. 
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5.4 What should the police do? 
5.4.1 Although not discussed in detail in this paper, the police management of data 
exposed numerous problems. For example, one piece of evidence says that 
the police found that their Excel crashed analyzing the data. It is surprising 
the police even tried using Excel to analyze the complex relations in such a 
large volume of data.  
5.4.2 Evidence I was given included analysis spreadsheets, which made me won-
der what other edits the police had made to what was claimed to be evidence: 
there was no clear management of the evidence. Despite the “forensic” meth-
ods the police claimed to use, they were not available with the evidence and 
did not help confirm provenance. I was never given any evidence with sig-
natures. 
5.4.3 The police assumed that data (or missing data) could be used to prove poor 
clinical practice. This encouraged the media, public, patients and relatives to 
assume the trial was about poor clinical practice and reinforced a view that 
patients were victims of poor care. But whether or not the hospital had poor 
clinical practice, the criminal case was much narrower. Even if the data had 
been reliable (which it was not), the connection between abstract data and 
clinical practice would have been tenuous at best. Indeed, even if the case 
had been proved, there had been no patient harm and it could not have said 
anything about quality of care. 
5.4.4 So far as I know, the police never considered assessing the internal or exter-
nal validity of their evidence. A cursory look at the database would have 
raised many questions about it. Instead, I think they probably never took a 
holistic view. Accepting IT evidence on faith is problematic. 
5.4.5 This was a case where alleged data discrepancies were used in evidence, so 
I was surprised at typos affecting data presented in the prosecution evidence 
— this is ironic, as the prosecution case relied on the quality of data (I am 
not saying the typos were sufficient in themselves to discredit the evidence). 
Of course I may have made some typos in my own evidence that we did not 
spot. In fact, I used Mathematica to analyze the data and automatically gen-
erate reports, tables and diagrams, etc: insofar as I can program reliably (and 
I more than double-checked every result), this ensured my reports were fac-
tually accurate. 
5.4.6 The police seized several glucometers. Other glucometers had been used on 
the ward, so not all of the relevant glucometers were seized. Had the trial 
proceeded, this would have become a criticism of the prosecution case — it 
is possible that the alleged fabrications are still stored on a misplaced glu-
cometer somewhere.  
5.4.7 What was the ward supposed to do when they lost their glucometers to the 
police? I wonder whether the police did a risk analysis (there is no evidence 
either way): in any case, removing glucometers off a ward puts patients at 
serious risk of harm, at much greater risk than any of the alleged incidents. 
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5.4.8 There were surprising conflicts of interest. A technician from TechCo cor-
rupted data, then selected the data from the hospital and handed it over to the 
police, and the police sent the glucometers to TechCo themselves to analyze 
and confirm whether they were functioning correctly. Independent experts 
should have been used throughout.  
5.4.9 As TechCo’s glucometers do not use an open architecture, independent ex-
perts should have been required to be present when the data was taken from 
the hospital and when any glucometer analysis was performed. 
5.4.10 Knowing glucometers function correctly when analyzed tells you very little 
about how they might have performed during alleged incidents. (For exam-
ple, they may have been serviced since the incidents.) The glucometers were 
not designed to answer such questions. The police should exercise more cau-
tion with test results, especially when undertaken by the manufacturer. 
5.4.11 It should be routine for manufacturers to be required to disclose relevant 
quality control documents and risk analyses in support of any claims that 
their products work to specification (e.g., as required by ISO 14971, ISO 
13485, etc). 
5.5 What should researchers do? 
5.5.1 A serious issue remains for researchers, the industry and regulators to ad-
dress is that clinical trials alone are insufficient to justify the quality of com-
puter systems or devices in normal use. The current peer reviewed literature 
is inadequate. We need both: clinical research (do things measure the clinical 
factors they claim?) and situated IT and HCI research of effectiveness in the 
 
Figure 6. Convergence of powerful research challenges, particularly when applied to the 
complexity, risks and priorities of healthcare. Healthcare has many opportunities, it needs 
IT to drive quality improvement — and new technical challenges (cybersecurity, big data 
and blockchain, etc) need relating to actual practice and human limitations through apply-
ing human factors embedded in the healthcare domain. See section 5.5.  
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real complexity of healthcare (will they be used correctly and is the data 
reliable?). Such research needs tying up “end to end”: is the final data, how-
ever the clinicians summarize or interact with it, effective for clinical use 
and correctly based on true clinical data? 
5.5.2 While cybersecurity research has a high profile, cybersecurity is only one 
aspect of the potential problems and vulnerabilities of medical devices and 
systems. More research is needed on end-to-end dependability, from HCI to 
networking and multi-vendor databases, interoperability, etc. Researchers 
should spearhead an analogous structure to the Information Sharing Analysis 
Organizations (ISAOs) established for cybersecurity. 
5.5.3 Formal methods is a substantial research area that has resulted in many ro-
bust approaches to software development — widely used in aviation, for ex-
ample. SPARK Ada is a good place for programmers to start (Barnes, 2003). 
Unfortunately, there is little connection between the formal methods com-
munity and healthcare, let alone healthcare IT. This gap urgently needs to be 
bridged. One of the many research problems is how to migrate large, com-
plex, buggy software (as in blood glucometers and their networking, for ex-
ample) into high quality software that works “well enough” — and increas-
ingly more reliably — until it is rigorously correct. 
5.5.4 Throughout this paper I have criticized the culture of assuming IT and data 
is perfect. In the UK, this culture is enshrined in law: the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 created the presumption that IT works correctly (Mason, 2012; 
Mason, 2014). Computers are deemed to be “in order” and “properly set and 
calibrated.” So we cannot simply blame the police or the hospitals when they 
just reflect the wider legal culture in which they operate, the absurd presump-
tions of the Act of Parliament being but a symptom. While Mason (op cit) 
gives a very professional discussion, including the problems of the inscruta-
bility of proprietary systems (e.g., those that are not open source) and the 
imbalance between prosecution and defence scrutiny, the challenge to re-
searchers is to create awareness and transformation of this absurd legal po-
sition.  
5.5.5 Researchers always need resourcing, and the convergence of cybersecurity, 
healthcare risks and costs, big data and blockchain technology closely 
matches many national research funding priorities, to say nothing of digital-
izing healthcare and increasingly relying on (unregulated? insecure?) apps. 
Human factors (e.g., human error) is often overlooked, for exactly the same 
reasons (“loss of situational awareness”) that cybersecurity is overlooked by 
healthcare — people are too busy doing, urgent, hard complex jobs, and this 
distracts attention from longer-term, broader priorities that are not immedi-
ately visible. Figure 6 visualizes this opportunity. 
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6 Discussion 
The big picture is that nobody seems to be fully aware of the complexity and risks 
of IT. This results in lax legislation, lax regulation and lax procurement, and in turn 
lax manufacturing since no useful standard of quality can be demanded by hospitals. 
Unawareness in turn results in lax management, and unnoticed inconsistencies be-
tween clinical care and its unreliable monitoring.  
Prominent peer-reviewed papers such as Nichols (2011) “Blood glucose testing 
in the hospital: Error sources and risk management” reinforce the naïvety: “software 
ensures accurate documentation,” “automation is the best prevention for errors,” 
“smarter software is assisting with result documentation,” etc. Even the recent UK 
Making IT Work report (Wachter, 2016) takes it for granted that computers work 
(with minor caveats on interoperability and usability) — hospitals just need to “dig-
italise” more, with another huge government investment (£4.2 billion) available to 
purchase IT. It takes it for granted there is appropriate IT that can be just purchased! 
The Wachter Report has a “digital maturity” scale, but it is about whether and to 
what extent a hospital has adopted levels of IT (and is paper free), not whether the 
IT is effective (and for what?) or even fit for purpose, which is just assumed. Every 
hospital is in good company, then, unwittingly “drifting into failure” (Dekker, 
2011). 
Ironically, if the hospital in the story here had been “paper free” (as the Wachter 
Report wants) there would have been no discrepancies to investigate; although there 
would have been no trial, the underlying IT problems would never have come to 
light. If we want a paper free health service, we also need to work out how to make 
it more reliable! 
System failure only becomes apparent after there is a visible incident. In the case 
described here, something triggered the police investigation and that became “the 
incident,” as discussed in this paper. In hospitals, reportable incidents usually in-
volve patient harm or near misses of harm; in this case, thankfully, there was no 
patient harm but considerable staff harm. Nobody benefitted from the process.  
With hindsight we can see many causes of the incident. All of them were avoid-
able; and avoiding only a few would have resulted in a much happier outcome. The 
wholly uncritical view of IT coupled with a remarkable unwillingness to consider 
alternative explanations for multiple IT problems related to tens of nurses are a text-
book example of confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance (Tavris & Aronson, 
2007); with so many nurses, underlying systemic factors, including management 
(Ball et al, 2013) and IT support (most of this paper) should have been obvious 
priorities to critically examine. 
The causes, then, are many and complex, and other hospitals will have analogous 
but diverse complex IT problems. A key priority should be to have a mature cyber-
security strategy, which implies having an implementation of IT that permits having 
a workable strategy. Whatever the mess or causes of the mess — external hacking 
or just internal hacking, as here — effective procedures must be in place to detect, 
interpret and respond to unusual or unauthorized activity immediately. The regular 
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crashing of critical systems should at least have been a warning sign. Hospitals need 
to tighten up their cybersecurity maturity. Good guidance on data management is 
available elsewhere (DSIWG, 2016). 
The hospital had ignored evidence of behavior the police treated as criminal; that 
is, the recording of tests on the database had no day-to-day significance (so far as I 
can tell). In any case, the process of getting data from a glucometer into the patient 
records was so slow and unreliable it was of no clinical use. Having correct and 
timely blood glucose measurements is a clinical priority but “correct” use of a point 
of care device and its IT system that was, unknown to anybody, not working well 
was not an issue, and certainly was not an issue for the hospital.  
When data was deleted, the hospital did not notice. The police apparently as-
sumed the corrupted data was perfect, and adequate evidence to charge nurses. 
There were many reasons that the data was unreliable, but the simplest was that 
TechCo themselves had corrupted large parts of it. That fact alone was sufficient 
for the trial to collapse, and it left the prosecution with no admissible evidence. 
Once the police investigation started, my impression was that the hospital felt 
unable to pursue any parallel investigation, and certainly they felt unable to help the 
expert witness in his enquiries (in hindsight I should have sought a court order). 
This missed early opportunities to uncover some of the systemic problems. A par-
allel cybersecurity investigation, done within the hospital, would have saved a huge 
waste of time and huge costs to the defendants. 
It is too easy to blame people at the sharp end. Nurses are at the sharp end, and 
a witch hunt makes a compelling story. A witch-hunt involves human things we feel 
we understand, and we feel angry about poor patient care and a sense of betrayal by 
nurses being incompetent (if they were). For everybody concerned, if you get rid of 
a witch the problem is immediately and visibly solved! Unfortunately, on the other 
hand, complex IT is hard to write a gripping story about; it really isn’t very inter-
esting, and there is no quick fix. Dekker (2009) discusses these important issues in 
much more detail than we can here. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper explored a case where unconsciously accepted unmanaged IT complex-
ity unnecessarily led to horrible outcomes. While the hospital had a core part to play 
in this story, the real villain in my opinion is TechCo. In principle they could pro-
duce better IT if they wanted to; they have had many years developing hospital 
equipment and must know very well how to do it: their equipment could have been 
much easier to use correctly in a real ward, and much easier to use to dependably 
monitor patient data and ward activity. TechCo’s systems failed the hospital, its 
staff and its patients.  
Nevertheless, the data corruption this case revolved around (the nurses’ alleged 
falsifications, the use of staff IDs, TechCo’s deletion of data, and the poor software 
that allowed it all to happen…) could have been detected and managed as soon as 
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they occurred had the hospital had a mature approach to cybersecurity. Given that 
TechCo systems were used, the problems were unavoidable, but they could have 
been detected and managed. They need never have escalated to a criminal prosecu-
tion.  
Given the widespread use of equally poor IT throughout healthcare, hoping for 
manufacturers to improve is less realistic than hoping for hospitals to prioritize ma-
ture cybersecurity. Fortunately, cybersecurity already has a high profile (thanks to 
fear of malicious hacking), and this paper adds one more reason to take it even more 
seriously. Luckily nobody was harmed as a result of any of the issues discussed in 
this paper, but a mature cybersecurity approach would also reduce unnoticed data 
problems of all sorts, and therefore would help reduce patient harm too. 
The broader problem remains our culture of uncritical acceptance of IT, from 
legal, regulatory, procurement and other perspectives, especially for healthcare 
where billions is eagerly invested in more IT stuff. Our culture makes us all uncrit-
ically believe that IT and especially the latest IT is wonderful — don’t we all want 
new things? (Of course, this is how companies stay in business.) But the reality is 
that behind the façade of superficial wonder, modern hospital IT is too complicated 
for its own good, for the good of patients, for the good of staff. Ironically, the newer 
IT is and the more exciting it seems, the less tested it is in the clinical environment.  
This culture nurtures a lax approach to cybersecurity. It created the perfect envi-
ronment (bad IT, bad IT management) for accepting a superficial explanation of 
alleged multiple nurse failures instead of exploring underlying causes.  
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